No Move without Free Movement.  The EU-Swiss controversy over quotas for free movement of persons by Carrera, S. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/145426
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
 Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs Programme, Elspeth Guild is 
Associate Senior Research Fellow and Katharina Eisele is a former Researcher at CEPS. 
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the EU policy-makers who were interviewed for the 
purposes of this paper. They would also like to thank Daniel Gros for his comments on a previous version of this 
piece. 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to 
any institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2015 
Centre for European Policy Studies▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
No Move without Free Movement: 
The EU-Swiss controversy over quotas for free movement of persons 
Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Katharina Eisele 
No. 331, April 2015 
Key points 
The focus of this Policy Brief is the Swiss referendum of 2014 against ‘mass immigration’ in 
Switzerland. It identifies the challenges that a quota on EU citizens’ free movement rights to 
Switzerland would pose to EU-Swiss relations, considering: i) the value of freedom of movement in the 
EU and its indivisibility from the internal market and other economic freedoms; ii) the specificity of the 
EU legal system following the Lisbon Treaty that has established specific democratic and judicial 
accountability mechanisms; iii) the lack of supranational judicial oversight of the EU-Switzerland 
agreements framework; and iv) the existence of the so-called guillotine mechanism, according to which 
the termination of the Free Movement Agreement would entail the automatic termination of the other 
agreements with the EU. 
Options and Recommendations 
OPTION 1: keep the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP):  
First, apply safeguard clauses in cases where there is evidence of “serious economic and social 
difficulties” in Switzerland, or introduce limitations that do not formally constitute a ‘quota’. 
A key dilemma with these safeguard clauses would be how to show objective evidence of these 
difficulties in Switzerland. Any limitations should not constitute ‘hidden quotas’ or quantitative 
restrictions in different guises. 
Second, launch a new referendum asking the Swiss people to vote on free movement, highlighting the 
economic benefits of the internal market and other instruments such as research and study within the 
EU. It is unclear whether a new referendum based on purely economic arguments would change the 
results. Any new referendum should also insist on combating racism and xenophobia. 
OPTION 2: review the AFMP and bring the acquis under EU democratic rule of law by ensuring judicial 
control by the Court of Justice of the EU. This would be our preferred option, as it would bring the 
existing Agreements Framework in line with the Lisbon Treaty, and ensure proper democratic 
accountability and judicial control. 
OPTION 3: terminate the AFMP and conclude a new agreement with a reduced scope envisaging 
quotas while keeping all the remaining rights. This option would mean that, on the basis of reciprocity, 
Swiss nationals would become ‘full’ third-country nationals for the purposes of entry and residence in 
the EU. 
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1. What are the issues?  
The 9 February 2014 referendum in Switzerland 
backing the initiative to introduce annual quotas 
on immigration has been the subject of much 
debate. The initiative, which was put forward 
by the Swiss People’s Party, passed with a 
narrow majority of 50.3% in favour. The 
outcome of the referendum must be 
implemented into the Swiss legal system by 
February 2017. The draft law to implement it 
aims to create “a new admission system” based 
on quantitative limits and quotas on 
immigration to the country, including mobility 
by nationals of EU member states (EU 
citizens). A key challenge resulting from this 
referendum would thus be the reintroduction of 
migration controls of EU citizens moving to 
Switzerland and the end of the current legal 
regime on free movement of persons. This has 
caused deep controversy and undermines EU-
Switzerland bilateral relations more generally. 
The results of the referendum call for measures 
that would directly contradict the EU-
Switzerland framework of cooperation, 
contravening as they do the Free Movement of 
Persons regime set out in an Agreement (AFMP) 
signed in 1999 and entering into force in 2002.1 
The AFMP reconfigured Swiss sovereignty and 
discretion as regards ‘migration controls’ by 
providing freedom of circulation and residence 
rights for EU nationals in Switzerland.  
Current rights include quota-free circulation for 
EU nationals (right of entry and short stay in 
Switzerland) with no conditions beyond proper 
identification (passport or ID). They also cover 
the right to work or be self-employed and reside 
in Switzerland for that purpose, as well as 
                                                     
1 Agreement between the European Community and its 
member states, on the one hand, and the Swiss 
Confederation on the other on the free movement of 
persons: Final Act, Joint Declarations, information 
relating to the entry into force of the seven agreements 
with the Swiss Confederation in the sectors of free 
movement of persons, air and land transport, public 
procurement, scientific and technological cooperation, 
mutual recognition in relation to conformity 
assessment, and trade in agricultural products, Official 
Journal L 114 , 30/04/2002 P. 0006 – 0072.  
residence on the basis of self-sufficiency. EU 
nationals residing in Switzerland on the basis of 
the agreement are entitled to a residence permit 
that evidences their right to security of residence 
(protection against expulsion, which is only 
permitted on the basis of public policy, public 
security or public health); geographic and work-
related internal mobility between the cantons, 
and non-discrimination or equality of treatment 
with Swiss nationals in the labour market.  
Two sets of rights are relevant in this matter: 
border- control-free access to the territory 
(Schengen border- control-free area) and EU free 
movement rights; the right to stay, reside and 
exercise economic activities. The referendum 
directly affects the second set of rights. 
Switzerland cannot place restrictions (such as 
quotas) on EU nationals’ rights of residence and 
economic activities without breaching the 
AFMP. In theory, it could refrain from 
introducing border controls on EU nationals and 
remain within the Schengen free movement area 
and still honour the outcome of the referendum. 
However, as we argue in sections 2 and 3 of this 
Policy Brief, the EU Council has already stated 
that the planned reform would cast profound 
doubts on Swiss membership of the Schengen 
Agreements (the legal framework for border- 
control-free movement of persons) and of the 
Dublin Agreement (on the allocation of 
responsibility for asylum seekers). 
The Swiss government introduced a draft law in 
June 2014 to transpose the referendum into the 
Swiss constitution with a new article following 
the “mass immigration initiative” (Article 121a 
of the constitution on “autonomous 
management of migration” (see Annex 1, in 
French, of this Policy Brief),2 which would 
amend the Foreigners Law in a far-reaching 
way. Also, Switzerland did not sign the Protocol 
extending the free movement agreement to 
Croatian nationals; the Swiss government 
introduced a separate quota system for Croatian 
nationals applicable from July 2014.3  
                                                     
2 See (www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis413t.html).  
3 www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en& 
msg-id=52804), see also EP briefing note: 
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The free movement of persons plays out in a 
wider setting of bilateral EU-Swiss legal 
instruments and agreements covering other 
domains. As the Council has reaffirmed that 
by participating in parts of the EU's internal 
market and policies, Switzerland is not only 
engaging in a bilateral relation but becomes 
a participant in a multilateral project.4 
The AFMP contains a ‘guillotine mechanism’ 
according to which its termination would entail 
the automatic termination of the six other 
agreements with the EU.5 A ‘standstill clause’ in 
Article 13 AFMP states that the contracting 
parties undertake not to adopt any further 
restrictive measures vis-à-vis each other’s 
nationals in the fields covered by AFMP. Free 
movement is thus an integral part of a package 
of bilateral instruments. Some are indeed 
intrinsically linked or cannot move without the 
other. 
2. Reactions from EU institutions 
The EU’s position can be summed up in a letter 
signed by former High Representative C. 
Ashton of 24 July 2014, where it was stated that 
such a reform would be 
in fundamental contradiction to the 
objective of the Agreement 
and that 
the EU is not in a position to agree with your 
request. 
In addition, in December 2014 the Council 
Conclusions “on a homogeneous extended 
single market and EU relations with Non-EU 
Western European countries” made clear that 
the free movement of persons is a 
fundamental pillar of EU policy and that the 
                                                                                       
(www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/201
4/536313/IPOL_BRI%282014%29536313_EN.pdf).  
4 Council conclusions on a homogeneous extended 
single market and EU relations with Non-EU Western 
European countries, General Affairs Council meeting 
Brussels, 16 December 2014, paragraph 44. 
5 They are retrievable from (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2002:114:TOC). 
internal market and its four freedoms are 
indivisible 
and that  
…the EU expects Switzerland to honour its 
obligations arising from the Agreement on 
the free movement of persons and the other 
agreements concluded with the EU. 
Furthermore, the Council expects 
Switzerland to fully ensure that EU citizens 
working or living on its territory, regardless 
of the moment of settlement and taking up 
employment in Switzerland, can exercise or 
continue to exercise their acquired rights 
without any restriction, and with the 
guarantee that the outcome of the popular 
initiative would not have a negative impact 
on them. In case of infringements of the 
above principles, the Council reserves its 
right to put an end to the abovementioned 
institutional negotiations and other internal 
market related negotiations. 
The Council also stated in these conclusions that  
… the planned implementation of the result 
of the vote threatens to undermine the core 
of EU-Switzerland relations, namely the so-
called ‘bilateral I agreements’, and casts 
doubt on the association of Switzerland to 
the Schengen and Dublin acquis and the 
participation of Switzerland in certain EU 
programmes.6 
As a consequence, the European Commission 
applied penalties by putting Swiss participation 
in H2020 and Erasmus+ on hold.7 After the new 
                                                     
6 Council conclusions, paragraph 45. 
7 See speech of former European Commissioner L. 
Andor of 26 February 2015 (http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_STATEMENT-14-32_en.htm); EU observer 
article of 13 June 2014: (https://euobserver.com/ 
political/124591); and the statement of the Swiss 
government: (www.news.admin.ch/message/ 
index.html?lang=en&msg-id=52251); The State 
Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation 
(SERI) and the Federal Office of Culture (FOC) have 
been asked to draw up interim solutions for the three 
programmes; see also the website EUResearCH, Swiss 
guide to European research and innovation: 
(www.euresearch.ch/de/european-programmes/ 
horizon-2020/swiss-participation-in-horizon-2020). See 
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Commission and the new European External 
Action Service (EEAS) were established, the 
Swiss government met in early 2015 with the 
Commission President Juncker, European 
Parliament President Schulz and Council 
President Tusk. They agreed on conducting 
‘consultations’ and nominating contact points.8 
The EU position has therefore not changed with 
the new EU inter-institutional landscape. EU 
institutions continue to take a firm stance on 
free movement and the need for the Swiss 
authorities to find an appropriate solution that 
would not jeopardise the current agreements.  
3. What are the challenges? 
3.1 Challenge 1: The value of freedom of 
movement in the EU  
One of the characteristics of this controversy is 
that it affects individuals and one of the 
foundational principles of the EU – the free 
movement of persons, which is now recognised 
as a fundamental right in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and is a central component 
of the internal market. The relevance that was 
attributed to free movement by the contracting 
parties is envisaged in the AFMP Preamble, 
which states that 
Convinced that the free movement of 
persons between the territories of the 
contracting parties is a key factor in the 
harmonious development of their relations.  
It is mainly EU citizens who would be affected 
by these measures. As the Swiss Federal Office 
for Migration Statistics indicated, 23.8% of the 
population permanently residing in Switzerland 
has a migrant background (see Annex 2 of this 
paper for a detailed overview).9 Nearly 66% 
(65.9%) of foreigners living in Switzerland 
                                                                                       
also (www.euractiv.com/global-europe/switzerland-
gets-penalty-immigra-news-533548)  
8 See (www.swissinfo.ch/eng/labour-control_ 
government-urges-calm-for-talks-on-eu-immigration-
curbs/41267674).  
9 See publication “La population de la Suisse 2013” of 
the Confédération Suisse, Office fédéral de la statistique 
OFS, Neuchâtel 2014. 
originate from an EU member state or Iceland, 
Liechtenstein or Norway.10 The main 
nationalities are Italians (298,900), followed by 
Germans (292,300), Portuguese (253,200) and 
French (110,100).  
By considering the introduction of quotas 
affecting the mobility of EU citizens to 
Switzerland, the Swiss authorities are not only 
challenging the most symbolic foundations of 
the EU, they are also categorising EU nationals 
as foreigners in Switzerland by subjecting them 
to new immigration rules. As the AFMP is 
reciprocal, one may wonder what implications 
the quotas would have on Swiss nationals 
moving to one of the EU member states. If the 
agreement is denounced, then Switzerland 
would be free to make any immigration rules it 
wishes regarding EU nationals seeking to move 
and reside there. But, on the basis of 
reciprocity, Swiss nationals will equally 
become ‘full’ third country nationals for the 
purposes of entry and residence in the EU. This 
means that they will need to fulfil the conditions 
of the Blue Card Directive for highly skilled, the 
Intra-corporate Transferees Directive or 
Seasonal Workers Directive if they want to come 
to work in the EU.11 
It is true that Article 23 secures ‘acquired rights’ 
by private individuals in the case of termination 
or non-renewal. It is to be welcomed in this 
context that the Swiss Federal Council stated in 
clear terms that under Article 23 AFMP, citizens 
of EU and EFTA countries who already live and 
work in Switzerland will continue to be able to 
invoke the rights conferred by the AFMP, even 
if the Agreement is terminated. The Article 
expressly states that rights acquired by private 
individuals will not be affected. Naturally, this 
also applies to Swiss citizens living or working 
in EU or EFTA countries. This provision also 
states that contracting parties will settle by 
mutual agreement what action is to be taken in 
                                                     
10 Ibid. 
11 For a detailed overview of the EU policy on legal 
immigration (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/ 
what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/index_en.htm).  
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respect of rights in the process of being 
acquired.12  
It is also worth noting that the results of the first 
referendum were welcomed by various populist 
(extreme) right and Eurosceptic political parties 
across Europe. As reported by The Guardian,13 
politicians like Geert Wilders (Dutch Party for 
Freedom) and Marine Le Pen (French Front 
National) celebrated the results and called on 
their respective countries to follow a similar 
anti-immigration initiative. Racism and 
xenophobia seem to have played a role in a 
second migration-related referendum,14 which 
was initiated by Ecopop, a Swiss ecological 
association that campaigned to restrict 
immigration for alleged environmental reasons 
and to reduce overpopulation.15 In this second 
referendum the Swiss population rejected a 
proposed net immigration cut to no more than 
0.2% of the population in November 2014.  
3.2 Challenge 2: The specificity of the EU legal 
system 
Another key challenge for the handling of this 
affair is the fact that the EU is a sui generis 
supranational entity functioning within the 
confinements of a specific legal system. The EU 
legal system has been designed along a ‘checks 
and balances’ regime that aims to manage the 
delicate interaction between EU and member 
state competences. The regime also seeks to link 
‘more EU’ to proper oversight and judicial 
supervision, based on common legal principles 
                                                     
12 (www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/ 
attachments/34644.pdf). This protective provision is 
part of the agreement, so if the agreement is denounced 
it too cease to apply although it is likely that the parties 
would respect its intended continuing effects. 
13 (www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/10/ 
switzerland-talks-eu-immigration-referendum).  
14 (www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ 
switzerland-votes-on-ending-mass-immigration-
9893224.html).  
15 (www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/ 
switzerland-rejects-immigration-cap) and 
(www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/switzerl
and-votes-on-tax-and-migration-billionaires-
nationalists).  
and rule of law standards. Freedom of 
movement as a fundamental right constitutes a 
core connecting principle to other freedoms and 
the internal market.  
The EU-Switzerland agreements were 
negotiated when the EU legal system was 
largely unfinished and still subject to a pre-
Lisbon Treaty setting. Since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 the EU 
has legal personality and clearer competences to 
conclude international agreements. The 
European Parliament now also has a 
strengthened role in giving consent to 
international agreements and in ensuring 
democratic accountability to the EU’s external 
relations, including in policy domains related to 
mobility. Judicial scrutiny by the Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg (CJEU) has been equally 
expanded and consolidated. Not least, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights has become 
legally binding, enshrining free movement as a 
key fundamental right. All these institutional 
and substantive arrangements have further 
delineated the specificity of the current EU legal 
regime, as well as the challenges inherent in 
finding a way forward that complies with a 
post-Lisbon Treaty scenario. 
3.3 Challenge 3: Lack of independent judicial 
review 
Judicial scrutiny indeed constitutes one of the 
innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the EU-
Switzerland polemic poses a related challenge: 
how do we ensure that restrictions and 
renegotiations of free movement are subject to 
judicial oversight, which would in turn ensure 
stability and transparency, and effective 
remedies before independent judicial authorities 
in the event of dispute? A key challenge of the 
‘bilateral agreements framework’ is the lack of 
independent supranational judicial oversight.16 
This has led external observers raising doubts 
                                                     
16 The AFMP as an international agreement concluded 
by the EU with a third state forms an integral part of the 
EU legal order and the CJEU has the competence to rule 
on the interpretation and application of the agreement. 
However, the Court’s jurisdiction currently only binds 
the member states and the EU. 
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about the overall effectiveness of the framework 
of bilateral relations. Lazowski (2014) has 
argued that  
From the legal point of view, the Swiss 
model of enhanced bilateralism or ‘chocolate 
box’ integration has been flawed from the 
start…. the lack of robust enforcement 
machinery has allowed Switzerland to 
allegedly breach the Free Movement of 
Persons Agreement as well as to undermine 
the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law.17 
Since 2008 the Council emphasised the need for 
an overarching institutional framework for EU-
Switzerland relations. In 2012, the Council 
specified that it  
… considers that further steps are necessary 
in order to ensure the homogeneous 
interpretation and application of the Internal 
Market rules. In particular, the Council 
deems it necessary to establish a suitable 
framework applicable to all existing and 
future agreements. This framework should, 
inter alia, provide for a legally binding 
mechanism as regards the adaptation of the 
agreements to the evolving EU acquis... All 
in all, this institutional framework should 
present a level of legal certainty and 
independence equivalent to the mechanisms 
created under the EEA Agreement.18 
The AFMP set up a ‘Joint Committee’ of 
representatives of the contracting parties 
(Article 14.1) that should reach its decisions by 
mutual agreement. The contracting parties 
limited the settlement of disputes to this Joint 
Committee concerning “the interpretation or the 
application of the agreement”. The decisions of 
the Joint Committee are not public, however. 
According to interviews conducted for the 
purposes of this paper, a number of 
disagreements concerned the so-called flanking 
measures. Flanking measures are meant to 
protect Swiss workers from social dumping. The 
                                                     
17 A. Lazowski (2014), The End of Chocolate Box-Like 
Integration? EU-Swiss Relations after the Referendum, 
CEPS Commentary, February 2014. 
18 Council Conclusions 20 December 2012. 
EU regarded them as discriminatory and 
incompatible with the FMP Agreement.19  
3.4 Challenge 4: Conditionality and inter-
linkages between agreements 
The AFMP is only one of a wider set of bilateral 
agreements that regulate EU-Swiss relations. 
There are, however, strong inter-linkages 
between the latter agreement and the others. As 
stated above, and in line with the guillotine 
clause, the termination of Swiss participation in 
the free movement regime would terminate the 
other agreements. As mentioned above, the EU 
institutions have already clearly indicated that 
the end of the free movement system would also 
raise serious doubts about cooperation in other 
related areas, such as the Schengen and Dublin 
Agreements, where Switzerland is an associated 
partner.20 Switzerland had expressed strong 
interest in participating in Schengen since the 
late 1990s, due to the expected negative 
consequences of non-participation for transit, 
tourism, security and the economy.21 
Switzerland has been an associated country to 
Schengen since December 2008.22 The 
introduction of quotas for EU citizens would 
jeopardise the intrinsic relationship between 
                                                     
19 Other disputes have dealt with the recognition of 
professional qualifications, as well as the fees charged 
for the recognition procedure. 
20 F. Filliez, Schengen/Dublin: The Association 
Agreements with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, in 
B. Martenczuk and S. van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty 
and Security: New Challenges for EU External 
Relations, VUB Press, Brussels University Press, pp. 
145-183. 
21 Refer to the answer by Federal Council of 25 February 
1998 on the consequences of Switzerland exclusion from 
the Schengen Agreement (www.parlament.ch/F/ 
Suche/Pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=19973676).  
22 See (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1955_en.htm). Refer to Council Decision of 28 January 
2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Agreement between the European 
Union, the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association 
with the implementation, application and development 
of the Schengen acquis (2008/146/EC) (see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/ 
?uri=OJ:L:2008:053:TOC).  
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migration and border controls in EU-Swiss 
relations.  
4. Ways forward: Three scenarios 
There are several possible scenarios to deal with 
the challenges emerging from the EU-
Switzerland controversy on the free movement 
of persons. The following three options can be 
considered: 
 Option 1: Current AFMP – A sort of status 
quo 
1. One possibility could be to apply one of the 
following safeguard clauses:  
First, Article 14.2 of the Agreement that foresees 
that in the event of “serious economic and social 
difficulties” the Joint Committee can examine 
appropriate measures to remedy the situation. It 
is not clear how these would be assessed in 
practice. The challenge here is who would 
determine and scrutinise these difficulties on the 
basis of objective, de-politicised evidence on the 
ground? Can Switzerland currently and 
objectively prove any of these circumstances?  
Second, the insertion of a revamped general 
safeguard clause (as proposed by Ambuehl)23 
for “statistically exceptional situations”, 
meaning in the case of serious economic or 
social difficulties. This general safeguard clause 
would stipulate an upper ceiling based on a 
formula in cases of ‘mass immigration’, and 
would therefore not be as strict as annual 
quotas. The revamped general safeguard clause 
would replace the existing (and expired) 
safeguard clause foreseen in Article 10 of the 
FMP Agreement. In the same provision the 
transitional restrictions are set out: the 
restrictions expired for all EU nationals except 
for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals for whom 
restrictions are in place until 31 May 2016 (plus 
a safeguard clause that could be invoked until 
May 2019). 
                                                     
23 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ 
spsr.12143/abstract  
Alternatively, the Swiss government could also 
decide not to introduce a ‘formal quota’. This 
approach could only be contested with a new 
referendum, given that no constitutional court 
exists in the Swiss legal system that could 
review the implementation of the referendum at 
national level. In our view, however, careful 
attention should be paid to actual effects that the 
application of these ‘safeguard clauses’ would 
have in practice, so that they are not turned into 
a system of ‘hidden quotas’ or quantitative 
restrictions in different guises based on political 
decisions without proper independent scrutiny 
and evidence.  
2. A new referendum: the Swiss government 
could launch a new referendum asking people 
to vote on a package of measures, not only 
including free movement rights of EU citizens 
again, but linking this to the internal market and 
other instruments such as research and students 
(Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+), Creative Europe 
and energy policies.24 A new referendum by the 
end of 2016 is reported to be one of the 
preferred options of the EEAS.25 
Notwithstanding this, if a second referendum 
were to be held several issues should be taken 
into consideration. As Acosta (2014) has 
previously argued, the main reason for the vote 
in the first referendum differed greatly from 
discussions that have emerged in other parts of 
Europe regarding immigration. In a country 
where the unemployment rate among Swiss 
citizens is low and the wealth of the economy is 
almost beyond imagination, a key factor that 
played a role in the ‘yes vote’ was the perceived 
overpopulation and the problems it seems to 
entail (e.g., transportation gridlock, housing 
shortages and booming prices).26 The extent to 
                                                     
24 See http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-
europe  
25 See EUobserver (https://euobserver.com/ 
institutional/128281), which states that “EU diplomat 
Maciej Popowski said that a new referendum is 
‘inevitable, probably at the end of 2016’”. 
26 D. Acosta (2014), “The Swiss referendum: Is free 
movement of people in danger in Europe?”, BEPA 
Monthly Brief, Issue 71, February 2014. 
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which purely economic arguments would 
change the results in a second vote is thus 
unclear. 
 Option 2: Review the current AFMP 
Any way forward needs to take account of the 
legal framework emerging from the Lisbon 
Treaty since December 2009, which has secured 
a specific version of EU rule of law. The 
agreements do not currently provide a 
comprehensive institutional framework in 
compliance with the ‘Lisbonisation’ of the EU 
legal system. 
Bringing the Agreement into line with EU 
democratic rule of law as envisaged in the 
Lisbon Treaty could therefore be another 
plausible option. This would be our preferred 
option, as it would bring the existing 
Agreements Framework in line with the 
Lisbon Treaty, and ensure proper democratic 
accountability and judicial control. A revised 
or ‘revamped’ agreement could include 
jurisdiction within the CJEU that is binding on 
all contracting parties, including Switzerland. It 
should be within CJEU competence to have the 
last word on the interpretation and application 
of the agreement. This should be based on an 
independent assessment of the ways in which 
the Joint Committee has functioned and 
performed its tasks over the last few years. This 
could also go hand in hand with setting up an 
effective accountability mechanism of the Joint 
Committee functioning and its decisions.  
 Option 3: Termination of the AFMP 
Article 25 of the AFMP provides the rules for 
termination. In line with Article 25.4 the 
termination of the FMP Agreement would 
trigger the termination of all six other Bilateral 
Agreements I.27  
The termination of the FMP Agreement would 
have serious consequences for Switzerland’s 
                                                     
27 Dealing with air transport, carriage of passengers and 
goods by road and rail, trade in agricultural products, 
the mutual recognition of conformity assessment, 
certain aspects of government procurement and 
scientific and technological cooperation. 
participation in the Schengen system on the 
abolition of border checks and the Dublin 
system on asylum. Both the Schengen 
Association Agreement and the Dublin 
Association Agreement concluded with 
Switzerland fall under the Bilateral Agreements 
II. The termination of the AFMP would not 
automatically lead to the termination of the two 
former agreements. However, as stated above, 
the Council has declared that the introduction of 
immigration quotas would cast doubt on the 
association of Switzerland to the Schengen and 
Dublin acquis. EU nationals would de facto 
become foreigners in Switzerland and be subject 
to checks and migration controls. Their 
foreigners would be EU nationals. The practical 
application of quotas would therefore raise 
tricky questions about Schengen participation 
and police cooperation. 
In the event of termination of the FMP 
Agreement the EU and Switzerland could 
consider concluding a new agreement with a 
reduced scope.28 Such an agreement could 
envisage the introduction of quotas while 
maintaining all the remaining rights and 
guarantees included in the current FMP 
Agreement, e.g. geographic and work-related 
internal mobility between the cantons for those 
with a residence permit. This would in any case 
constitute a considerable step backwards in EU-
Swiss relations, given that the AFMP (along 
with the EEA Agreement) has been considered 
as a prime model in EU external relations. 
                                                     
28 The EU currently maintains a wide variety of other, 
much less close forms of cooperation and partnership 
agreements with third countries, partly covering 
migration. 
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Annex 1. 
Initiative populaire fédérale ‘Contre l'immigration de masse’29 
 
I 
La Constitution1 est modifiée comme suit: 
Art. 121 Titre (nouveau) Législation dans le domaine des étrangers et de l’asile 
Art. 121a (nouveau) Gestion de l’immigration 
1 La Suisse gère de manière autonome l’immigration des étrangers. 
2 Le nombre des autorisations délivrées pour le séjour des étrangers en Suisse est limité par des plafonds 
et des contingents annuels. Les plafonds valent pour toutes les autorisations délivrées en vertu du droit 
des étrangers, domaine de l’asile inclus. Le droit au séjour durable, au regroupement familial et aux 
prestations sociales peut être limité. 
3 Les plafonds et les contingents annuels pour les étrangers exerçant une activité lucrative doivent être 
fixés en fonction des intérêts économiques globaux de la Suisse et dans le respect du principe de la 
préférence nationale; ils doivent inclure les frontaliers. Les critères déterminants pour l’octroi 
d’autorisations de séjour sont en particulier la demande d’un employeur, la capacité d’intégration et une 
source de revenus suffisante et autonome. 
4 Aucun traité international contraire au présent article ne sera conclu. 
5 La loi règle les modalités. 
 
II 
Les dispositions transitoires de la Constitution sont modifiées comme suit: 
Art. 197, ch. 92 (nouveau) 
9. Disposition transitoire ad art. 121a (Gestion de l’immigration) 
1 Les traités internationaux contraires à l’art. 121a doivent être renégociés et adaptés dans un délai de 
trois ans à compter de l’acceptation dudit article par le peuple et les cantons. 
2 Si les lois d’application afférentes ne sont pas entrées en vigueur dans les trois ans à compter de 
l’acceptation de l’art. 121a par le peuple et les cantons, le Conseil fédéral édicte provisoirement les 
dispositions d’application nécessaires par voie d’ordonnance. 
 
  
                                                     
29 Swiss Confederation, Federal Chancellery (http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis413t.html).  
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Annex 2. 
Migration and Integration – Indicators on Foreign Population residing permanently 
in Switzerland by nationality30 
 
en milliers (in thousands) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 1714.0 1766.3 1816.0 1870.0 1937.4 
Pays de l'UE-28/AELE 1112.7 1135.0 1177.5 1223.4 1276.9 
Allemagne 251.9 263.3 275.3 284.2 292.3 
France 92.5 95.6 99.9 104.0 110.1 
Italie 290.6 287.1 288.0 291.8 298.9 
Autriche 36.7 37.0 37.9 38.8 39.5 
Portugal 206.0 212.6 223.7 237.9 253.2 
Espagne 65.0 64.1 65.8 69.4 75.3 
Autres pays de l'Europe 367.1 369.1 368.3 368.4 369.9 
Serbie-et-Monténégro 181.3 … ... ... .... 
Serbie ... 121.9 109.3 98.7 90.7 
Turquie 71.6 71.8 71.4 70.8 70.4 
Afrique 57.7 71.5 74.8 78.2 83.9 
Amérique 72.7 74.5 76.6 77.7 78.4 
Asie 99.3 110.5 113.6 117.2 122.9 
Océanie 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Apatride, nationalité inconnue 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Source: PETRA, STATPOP cited by: Confédération Suisse, Office fédéral de la statistique OFS. 
                                                     
30 Based on (www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/22/publ.html?publicationID=5746). 
For more information see (www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/07/blank/key/04.html).  
